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A FOREIGN POLICY FOR PEACE 
If I talk seriously with you tonight, it is because the subject with which 
I deal is deadly serious. If I ask you to forgo for a few minutes the undeniable 
pleasures of partisanship, it is because peace and war are matters which transcend 
parties. And it is of peace and war that I am going to talk--the hope for one, 
the danger of the other. 
At this moment, there is a small area in the Panmunjom sector of the Korean 
front where no bombs fall, where machine guns and rifles are silent. Sick and 
wounded Americans and other UN soldiers have converged on this quiet area from 
the prison camps of North Korea, their mutilations grim reminders that war is 
not paid for in dollars alone but primarily in the blood, limbs and lives of 
human beings. 
And from the prison camps of South Korea, into the same area, has come a 
steady stream of Communist sick and wounded. The two groups of prisoners are 
being exchanged in an orderly process in accordance ~th agreements negotiated 
by the UN and the Communist commanders. 
Move out from the small truce area at Panmunjom and the picture changes. 
All along the line, stretching across the desolate hills of Korea, the grim 
struggle, now in its third year, continues. Napalm flashes light up the night. 
Machine gun bursts and rifle fire shatter the stillness. communists kill, wound 
and capture UN forces and, in turn, are killed, wounded and captured . 
In one small sector of the Korean front, there is the promise of peace. 
In the rest, the reality of war. 
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I have drawn this contrast because it illustrates in a way the kind of 
dilemma in which we and other peoples of the world find ours~ves in this 
spring of 1953. 
In our hearts, we cling to a small sector which holds the hope of a 
durable meaningful peace. The rest is flooded with the fear of war. ~nd 
in our minds, one question predominates: will the hope prevail or will the 
flood of a third world war envelop it, not only at Panmunjom but over the 
face of the globe? 
This same question, in a sense, has been with us almost since the 
close of World war II. If the answer were ours alone to give, I think we 
would have long since given it. But it is not ours alone . The answer, the 
final answer, is locked within the walls of the Kremlin. 
I do not mean to suggest that we are absolved of all responsibility 
in this i s sue of peace or war or that wP- must sit helplessly waiting for 
the blow to descend when the Kremlin decides to loose it . On the contrary, 
what decisions we make or do not make, what actions we take or fail to take 
are bound to influence profoundly the final answer that issues from the brood-
ing political fortress in Moscow. 
What we have done, the actions we have so far taken in the postwar years, 
I believe, have already had an effect on the answer. They have served to 
restrain until now the forces of aggression from plunging the world into full-
scale strife. They have been instrumental in instilling in many free nations 
the economic stability necessary to maintain internal order and to contribute 
to the collective defense of peace. They have helped to create, in short, 
situations of strength in many parts of the free world. 
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These actions of postwar foreign policy have been the actions of mature 
leadership, motivated by a deep sense of the responsibility that has fallen 
to the United States and an inspired ~aith in the future of freedom. These 
actions have so far prevented \o/orld War III--these <~ctions , ,and not vain 
threats hurled across the ocean from the towerSt M' Ne r 'lo.Jro!t or the shaking of 
fists from armchairs in Washington . 
I am happy to report to you, tonight, that the President and the Secretary 
of State have shown during the first ~ew weeks of their tenures evidence of 
continuing in foreign policy, in the same responsible vein as their predecessors. 
Initial appointments in this field have generally been sound. The removal of 
the Seventh Fleet from partial duties in the Formosan Straits , which the 
President ordered soon after his inauguration, was justified by the changing 
situation on the Chinese mainland and on Formosa. Let there be no mistake, 
however, about the purpose of the order that originally put the Fleet into 
the straits. It was not, as has been implied for purposes of politics, a 
measure to restrain the National Government from launching military action 
against the mainland. The Nationalists were utterly incapable of such action 
when the order was issued in 1950 . On the contrary, it probably saved them 
from complete annihilation by the Chinese Communist armies which were then on 
the verge of launching an assault on Formosa. 
In his first major foreign policy address after assuming office, his 
speech of April 16, the President gave eloquent expression to the consuming 
desire of the American people and of people everywhere, for peace. That he 
could make an address of this kind at all was due to the sound groundwork 
l - w'c iCi· Qd 2 Pliu 
T
v I ~
which had previously been laid. He was able to speak for peace from a plat-
form of strength, a platform supported by the military power of the United 
States and the highest degree of unity ever achieved among free nations in 
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peacetime. nd in painting his plea for disarmacent in the bright colors of 
a better and fUller life for peoples eve~·here he had before htc the model 
~:4r c;v~ 
bequeathed to all of us by the late great~ enator from Connecticut, Brian 
MacMahon. 
The President's peace proposal was well-timed and well-spoken. Will 
it lead, if not to durable peace, at least to an easing of the present 
tensions which threaten to tear the world apart? The final answer, as I 
have already suggested, must be sought~ not in iashington or even in 
Panmunjom, but in Moscow . In dealing with the Soviet Union, t here are few 
certainties; there are at best merely indicators. To the outside world, 
Stalin ' s death has had only one certain effect: an enigmatic scowl has 
replaced an enigmatic smile in the Kremlin, But if that has been the only 
certainty, there have been many indicators of far-reaching changes inside 
the soviet Union and in its foreign policy. Doctors are suddenly released 
from jails where they have languished on false convictions of poisoning 
high officials. Soviet newspapers speak of an end to one-mao rule. Abroad, 
the peace feelers become too numerous and too insistent to be ignored. The 
Russians agree to discuss air safety over Germany . ~rican editors are 
invited to visit the USSR . Truce talks are resumed at Panmunjom. And finally, 
the Soviet press reacts with almost unprecedented courtesy to an address on 
peace by the President of the United states . 
That there is a pattern in these developments in soviet foreign policy 
goes without saying. But what does it signify? Are the Russians sincerely 
interested in a settlement of the issues which divide the world? Or are 
these recent moves mere feints to lull the west into a false sense of security? 
Or are they designed, perhaps, to split the United tates and estern Europe? 
Or could it be that all Soviet moves in the international arena at this time 
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are cloaks to conceal debilitating developments inside the vast Soviet 
empire? 
It is entirely possible that Stalin ' s death has produced schisms within 
the sprawling Communist world and that they are spreading from the eastern 
European satellites to the Pacific. It may also be that the real successor 
to Stalin does not yet sit upon the Soviet throne. If this is so, then the 
struggle for succession is likely to narrow down eventually to two men . Just 
as Lenin ' s choice, Trotsky, was forced to give way to Stalin, so too may 
Stalin's selection, Malenkov, yet have to yield to Deputy Premier Lavrenti 
Beria. Beria is master of the secret police and the atomic projects east 
of the urals. As Minister of tnterior, he rides the same road that has led 
practically all of the present rulers of the Communist states through the 
dark labyrinths of the political unde~iorld to ultimate power . 
Whatever the probability, one thing is certain: Stalin's death has 
produced one of the decisive moments in the history of the 20th Century . If 
this nation rises to the demands of the moment, we may yet lead the world 
out of the shadow of atomic annihilation into a new era of international 
enlightenment and human progress. If we falter, it is possible that the 
delicately balanced international structure which presently houses not only 
the heritage of freedom but the heart of civilization itself may be blasted 
into historical oblivion . 
We will not fail if we continue to discharge our responsibilities with 
the same dedication and determination that we have displayed during the last 
decade. We will not fail if, in the international arena, we act with wisdom, 
with restraint and with singleness of purpose. 
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We cannot know vith any certainty vhat is in the Soviet mind. We can 
knov vhat is in our ovn. Speculations on what Russia vill do next may be 
an interesting diversion, but they vill not lead to peace. I believe we 
can have peace or at least a measure of security in which freedom can live, 
vork and breathe, only if ve are clear in our minds that, regardless of 
Soviet gestures, ve must continue to build in the future on the groundvork 
that has been ~id in the past. If ve vould have peace ve must do vhat 
must be done . We must take the actions that must be taken. 
First of all there is a need for a single line of authority in the 
expression and conduct of our official foreign policy. It is time for 
amateurs to stop playing at diplomacy. It is time for generals, retired 
or othervise, to cease the unmilitary practice of grinding their axes in 
public. It is time, finally, to unify the conduct of foreign policy under 
the President and the Secretary of State. There are at present so many 
official Americans and so many agencies operating abroad that the voice of 
America seems to issue from a tover of Babel. As a first step in ending 
this expensive, dangerous and sometimes ludicrous situation, ve should dis-
solve the Mutual Security Agency and transfer to the Department of State any 
residual functions it may have. 
Abroad, ve must continue to vork tc perfect and to extend the many 
instrumentalities vhich have already been established for maintaining the 
stability and collective security of free nations. These instrumentalities 
are essential regardless of the intent of the Russian peace feelers. If 
these peace feelers are genuine, the NATO, the Organization of the American 
States, the Pacific Security pacts and the United Nations are not impediments 
to a settlement. There is sufficient flexibility in all of them to adjust 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 37, Folder 4, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 7 -
to new situations. If the feelers are not genuine, then these links become 
all the more vital to us and to other free nations. 
We must not allow thest positi~measures for world stability to be side-
tracked by Soviet moves whose full significance we cannot begin to comprehend. 
The Russians may be entirely sincere about a settlement at this time; they 
may very well desire, for reasons of their own, a temporary easement of the 
tensions between East and west. It does not follow, however, that the long-
range struggle between freedom and tyranny is about to end. And it is with 
the realities of the long-range that our foreign policy must deal if it is 
really to serve the needs of the nation. The regional security arrangements 
which have been so painstakingly devised during the past five or six years 
are long-range instruments, not temporary toys to be picked up or dropped 
at the whim of the Soviet Union. 
The task before us, then, is to continue to extend the gains for freedom 
which have already been registered. In Western Europe, the NATO build-up 
must go on. A way must be found to reconcile the French and the Germans so 
that the latter can be brought firmly and irrevocably into the Western world. 
And a way must also be found to solve the deep-seated economic difficulties 
of Europe. We should continue to urge and to assist the Europeans towards 
economic integration. Beyond integration, the need is for trade not aid . 
Only in this manner can we halt giveaways without at the same time inviting 
Western Europe to turn east to trade and tyranny. 
The policies of the present administration towards western Europe appear 
to be growing logically out of the past and to be in accord with current needs. 
There has been some dragging of feet in coming to grips with economic questions 
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but, on the other hand, the President's recent proposal to admit 240,000 
additional refugees, if adopted, should help to solve the more acute problemn 
of population pressure. 
Similarly, policy in the Far East has thus far been a logical continu tion 
of measures taken in the preceding years. I have already mentioned the re-
moval of the 7th Fleet from the Formosan Straits. I should like to stress, 
however, that this action must not be the beginning of a descent which wil 
lead us step by step after the Chin se Nation lists into the quicksands of 
the Chinese mainland. ~~tever course we pursue with respect to the Far East, 
and in the final situation there we can hardly predict that course, it is 
most essential that we act largely in concert with other free nations. For 
the present, I do not think that we should allow ourselves to build unreal 
hopes for easy solutions . baee& ga &QA exi&teat a•••a~8 i& ~Maeea. We 
would do better to deal with the grim unfinished business in Korea. 
The objectives which ve had in going into Korea, and which we still have, 
were to preserve the South Korean Republic, to stop and to punish the aggres-
sion against t hat Republic. By stopping a local aggression we hoped to prevent 
a general war later; by fighting in Korea we hoped to save this land of ours from 
attack in the future . 
What we did not set out to do in Korea, what we vere not required by any 
mandate of the United Nations to do, vas to unity all of Korea by force. The 
task of unifying Korea, is a task for the Korean people themselves with what-
ever help may be given them by the United States. What we did not set out to 
do was to begin World war III . 
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We failed once to distinguish what we set out to do and what we did 
not set out to do in Korea. I trust that we shall not fail again. In 
November 1950, United Nations forces had pushed back a beachhead at Pusan 
to the thirty-eighth parallel. At that point we had accomplished what we 
had set out to do . He had met the aggressors, punished them severely, and 
all but destroyed their armies . The security of our forces made it necessary 
to advance some distance beyond the thirty-eighth paralleL 
When these forces bad reached the narrow defensible neck of the Korean 
peninsula, some miles south of the Chinese border, I urged that we call a 
halt to the advance and try to crea~a buffer zone along the Chinese Manchurian 
and Korean frontier. But in the mistaken belief fostered by faulty military 
intelligence, that the Chinese Communists would not enter the war, that we 
could "end the war by Christmas" our troops were sent probing, in dangerously 
extended lines, towards the Chinese border. 
The Chinese Communists entered the conflict . We suffered a major defeat. 
Some of those who just a few weeks before had been most vociferous in urging 
our advance to the Chinese border began to press for two alternatives, and 
they have been at it ever since, either the complete abandonment of Korea or 
the extension of the ,.,ar all the '<ray into Manchuria and beyond. This "get 
in or get out'' extremism .rould profit no one but our enemies. 
The recent exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners gives us some hope 
that a truce may yet be negotiated at Panmunjom. ~le should be prepared to 
continue negotiations· oa- the basis of the Indian proposal. of...;_t~1!t ye'M • ---we 
ha.lfe-lrc-ceptea tba't proposal; --the Communists ha.Ye""not"':'-'When they are ready 
te end the fight!ng, tbey vil'l acknowledge 'tft!tt· rnd1a h~s offered a solut.ion 
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that i~ botb-Ju~end honorab~. In the meantime) the adcinistration should 
carry out the c~paign promise to accelerate the training of South Korean 
~
troopshso that ~rican forces in Korea can be reduced. 
I have spoken at some length of the problems which must be dealt vith 
in Europe and the Far East for they are the principal keys to var or ~ace. 
Elsehvere in the vorld, however , other difficulties confront us. In the 
Middle East, the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute , the Suez-Sudan issue and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict must be resolved in a manner that vill produce coopera-
tion and not bitterness among the parties involved. Out of such solutions 
will come the basis for a Middle East Command which can be linked with the 
NATO in a continuous belt of defense stretching around the perimeter of 
\-/estern and Southern Europe . 
Closer to home , in Latin America, ve must act quickly to repair the 
damage done to the C~od Neighbor policy by our neglect of this area. Signs 
are multiplying but t he communist infection which has settled into Guatemala 
may be spreading to surrounding areas. The time to stop the infection is now. 
In this brief talk tonight , I have catalogued some of the problems ~ith 
which our foreign policy must cope successfully if it is to lead to a genuinely 
peaceful world. We cannot expect the present administration or any ndministra-
tion to solve all of these problems. What ve can expect, what we have every 
right to expect is that this administration will continue to grapple with them 
in an intelligent constructive fashion . As long as they strive to do so, the 
President and the Secretary of State have a right to expect in return our 
confidence and support . And they shall have it from us, not grudgingly and 
reluctantly, but willingly as befits Americans who place country above party. 
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I should like to return briefly in closing to the contrast that I drew 
at the outset. I spoke then of the small sector of peace and the long line 
of continuing conflict in Korea . I should like to say now that if the truce 
the 
that holds tenuously at Panmunjom spreads across/length and breadth of Korea, 
I believe it may well mark the first major step of the world away from the 
brink of the catastrophe on which it has tottered for too long. 
I do not know what the outcome will be in Korea; the issue still hangs 
in a delicate intricate balance. I can only express my own feelings and yours 
when I say that our profoundest desire, tonight, is that the step taken will 
lead not into the long night of a third world war, but towards a new era of 
peace for all mankind. 







On page ~ - in the third/ from the ia~s bottom there i s 
the word "laid" --- in the original speech on page 6 
they had the word •paid". We thought it should have been 
laidxmd: instead . 
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